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AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT INNOVATION: 
THE RISKS OF STASIS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Stasis is a word used by the ancient Greeks to mean many different things: civil war, 
arguments between factions, ‘a stoppage’.  Today it generally means a cessation of progress 
or change.  ATM in Europe is in danger of being in stasis, because current ATM safety 
regulation policies are tending to make it more and more difficult to innovate, to introduce 
new technologies and ways of operating. 
 
The following essentially highlights the key findings of a group of published research papers 
analysing a variety of problems with ATM safety regulation policies.  These policies mainly 
derive from the Eurocontrol Safety Regulation Commission (SRC), but also from ICAO.  The 
case studies discussed are: the role of ground-based safety nets (Short Term Conflict Alert – 
STCA); air-based safety nets – Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems (ACAS); and risk 
assessment and mitigation in ATM (SRC’s Safety Regulatory Requirement Number 4 – 
‘ESARR4’).  These policies were no doubt developed with good intentions but, in quality-
management jargon, they are not ‘fit for purpose’. 
CHECKLIST OF POSSIBLE SAFETY POLICY PRINCIPLES 
A safety policy must add significant worthwhile and valid content to decision-making.  If it 
does not, then what is its value?  Who needs unnecessary unproductive bureaucracy and 
fruitless activity in ATM safety management and regulation?  It can add value in several 
ways.  The kinds of things it can do are: 
• Clarify decision-making processes.  It can show the process by which decisions can be 
made rationally.  It can give examples of how to set out logical and comprehensive safety 
arguments.  It can correct misunderstandings. 
• Learn lessons from past accidents and incidents.  It would be a poor policy that did not 
learn from the past.  If certain types of human error produces significant risks, then the 
policy would show what steps are need to correct or mitigate them.  If certain kinds of 
failure mode had been ignored in the past, then it would instruct the reader to include 
them in hazard analyses. 
• Generate safe system improvements.  This must be the most important feature.  A good 
safety policy is one that considerably reduces the risks of an accident in future and/or 
permits safe innovations.  If, for example, technology offers ways of dramatically 
reducing fuel costs and/or carbon emissions, then ways should surely be found for using it 
safely. 
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Make sense organisationally.  Safety policies may have complex implications on 
safety culture and ATC provider organisations.  The ownership of policies must be 
clear and sensible.  This ownership should include incentives for better safety 
performance.  Does the policy help?   
Recognise the reality of ATC.  Controllers are people.  People make mistakes.  
Therefore controllers make mistakes. 
 
A rigorous process needs to be followed.  Draft safety policies need to be exposed to scrutiny 
by the full range of professional criticism, with all the key source material underpinning 
regulations being in the public domain.  What assumptions have been made?  Are safety 
responsibilities clear, complete and comprehensive?  Could there be sensible arguments 
against this openness and vigilance?   
 
When there is a feasible, preferably quantitative, way of doing something, then it should be 
explained clearly, with real-life examples.  Are there arguments against it?  When building a 
house, would guidance material from Mademoiselle M., who has built many houses and who 
knows what difficulties can be faced in reality, be better than help from Mr P., who has never 
built a house in his whole life, but who has read introductory books on house building?   
CASE STUDY: STCA 
Current SRC policy says that changes to the ATM system (including safety minima) must be 
demonstrated through risk assessments to meet the Target Level of Safety (TLS) without 
needing to take safety nets such as STCA into account.  The TLS here is a design hurdle, a 
quantified risk level that a system should – i.e. be designed to – deliver.  A TLS covers all 
aviation-related causes, but does not usually attempt to cover the consequences of terrorism or 
criminal behaviour.  This policy of excluding STCA is wrong and because it does not build 
rationally and consistently from ATM’s firm foundations of TLS and hazard analysis. 
 
It is worthwhile setting out some UK background.  The UK’s National Air Traffic Services 
(NATS) introduced STCA progressively from the late 1980s.  STCA functionality had been in 
its radar data processing system for several years previously but had not been implemented.  
This was mainly because of inadequate secondary radar performance. 
 
Until the mid-1980s, NATS’ senior managers believed that the UK ATC system was 
acceptably safe, even with rapid traffic growth and pressure on operational staff.  Several 
serious Airproxes then occurred and received wide publicity.  The chairman of the UK CAA, 
effectively the safety regulator, asked the head of NATS to give guarantees that the UK 
system was safe and that the ATC-related causes of the Airproxes would quickly be 
eliminated. 
 
NATS could not give such guarantees and therefore decided to introduce STCA.  The key 
policy points here are: 
• STCA was not a desirable add-on to an already acceptably safe ATC system.  STCA was 
necessary for NATS to deliver the level of ATC safety required by the CAA. 
• STCA could offer a near-guarantee of detecting the ATC-related causes for the observed 
Airproxes in sufficient time for controller action. 
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• NATS hazard analyses showed that STCA would improve safety, except in situations 
where there were wider ATC operational and/or regulatory failures (compare the 
Überlingen mid-air collision). 
The UK and NATS are not unique in these kinds of decisions. 
 
In system safety analyses, STCA appears in exactly the same way as help from colleagues.  
STCA is effectively an extra colleague, dedicated to one supporting task – extrapolating radar 
tracks.  Thus STCA is part of the ground ATC system.  The effects of STCA in reducing 
deaths from mid-air collisions should therefore be fully included in safety assessments, hazard 
analysis and safety audits.  Figure 1 sets out a list of questions and answers about this 
‘Rational STCA Policy’. 
CASE STUDY: ACAS 
Present ICAO ACAS Policy says that ATC systems and procedures must be ‘acceptably safe’ 
– i.e. meet TLSs or similar requirements – without considering the effects of the ACAS 
safeguard.  This policy is invalid.  The core problem with this policy is: 
• As a first step, ATC safety targets for future systems generally assume that the current 
system is acceptably safe, and then add in the challenge of a sizeable factor for continued 
improvements or to meet the challenge of increased traffic 
• But there are significant numbers of incidents – potential accidents – in the current system 
that are resolved only by the use of ACAS.  Current ATC performance, and hence the 
baseline for safety targets, therefore relies on the safety gains delivered by ACAS.  If the 
current system were to be proved acceptably safe ‘without ACAS’, it would need to be 
demonstrated that the great majority of these kinds of incidents were either not safety 
significant or that other system defences would have successfully resolved them.  ICAO 
has not offered such a safety demonstration for the current European system, with its 
dense, complex ATC-controlled airspaces.   
• The present ICAO policy therefore demands that the future system ‘without ACAS’ will 
deliver markedly higher safety performance than the current system ‘with ACAS’ is just 
about managing to achieve.  Where is a reasoned justification for this extra constraint?  
This is like saying that, just to qualify to enter the next Olympic Games 100 metres 
competition, you will need to break the world record whilst wearing winter clothing: 
certainly a highly cautious performance target, but probably leading to zero competitors 
taking part – the stasis effect. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate this core problem; the data is from UK Airproxes with ACAS 
Resolution Advisories (RAs).  In Table 1 the controller did not detect the conflict and STCA 
did not trigger.  In Table 2 STCA triggered but the controller did not act on the alert. 
 
The miss distances H and V at the closest point of approach in Tables 1 and 2 were 
measurements taken after the pilots’ action in following the RA.  Miss distances, had ACAS 
not existed, would need to be estimated from the individual incident reports.  They would 
generally have been much less than those achieved with the benefit of ACAS. 
 
The incidents in Tables 1 and 2 had safety significance, given the breaches of separation 
minima.  In several of the incidents the report does not suggest that the ATC team detected 
the potential close approach.  These failures often seem to be from states of impaired situation 
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awareness in a controller’s mind.  Controllers need to remember to perform activities in the 
future.  Successful completion of an intended action in the future depends on a type of 
remembering called ‘prospective memory’.  What produces these problems, and how can they 
be prevented from happening or additional protection be provided?   
 
The safety defence that made the difference – that delivered acceptable safety – was ACAS.  
If the present system is supposed to be acceptably safe without ACAS, then where is the 
demonstration that the kinds of incidents in Tables 1 and 2 would have been successfully 
resolved in such as case?   
 
Thus ACAS should be viewed as a fully integrated part of the ATM safety system, not some 
kind of supplement.  The effects of ACAS in reducing the risks of mid-air collision should be 
fully included in safety assessments, hazard analysis and safety audits.  Figure 1 sets out a list 
of questions and answers about this Rational ACAS Policy, based on an analysis of ICAO 
documents. 
CASE STUDY: ESARR4 
The SRC’s ESARR4 and its supporting material are long and complex documents, so this is a 
sketch of the issues involved.  The main point is that the onus is on the SRC to demonstrate, 
by reference to past successful work documented in the policy/research literature, that the 
ESARR4 approach actually delivers the goods.  Much of ESARR4 is quite reasonable – 
concerned with sensible good housekeeping and safety process/documentation issues.  The 
problems arise in respect to strategic safety and hazard analysis issues: the focus is very much 
on these critical pieces of text. 
 
ESARR4 is an SRC Requirement.  An ideal Requirement would presumably look something 
like Figure 1.  The diagram focuses on the word ‘specified’.  The data needed to do the job is 
clearly set out and it should be processed in well-defined ways.  The data would be a 
description of the ATM subsystem and its relevant performance.  The process would be a 
logical set of calculations and well-defined assessment procedures.  But a critical reading 
shows that ESARR4 does not deliver.  It does not produce answers usable by prudent decision 
makers.  It is in practice more complex and less helpful than the ideal of Figure 3 and more 
like Figure 4.  The answer that comes out at the end is usually an indecisive one, leading to a 
need for more data – which often does not exist – or for some kind of expert judgement in 
order to make a decision.  Excessive use of expert judgement is open to many criticisms.  
Consistency may just be consistently wrong: differences in viewpoint may be expressions of 
people’s pessimism or optimism.  It is important to restrict expert judgement to topics and 
events that have been experienced by operational experts. 
 
Some specific practical and technical flaws of ESARR4 include: 
• Lack of clarity about responsibilities for ATM safety (e.g. accidents attributable to 
safety regulatory decisions or practices); 
• Not based on practically proven techniques.  Surely ATM safety must build on 
successful best practice? 
• Reliance on ‘mechanical’ probabilistic safety assessment; 
• Ignoring risk assessment techniques successfully used in ATM, which are well 
documented in other Eurocontrol publications; 
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• Not distinguishing between different types of ATM subsystem (e.g. Weick’s tightly 
coupled and loosely coupled); 
• Unstructured use of expert judgement; 
• Careless use of ‘worst case’. 
 
Thus ESARR4 leaves it to the service provider to make a safety case but provides no 
examples about how this might reasonably be done.  This is very poor guidance material.  
Examples need to be given, covering the whole range of real-life potential problems – of how 
such tasks are to be accomplished.  ESARR4 must show how big, real-life ATM safety 
problems have been tackled successfully. 
 
Does ESARR4 tend to suggest that safety regulators have a limited role – almost a fire-and-
forget mentality?  It is surely not sufficient for a safety regulatory body to deal in abstractions 
– a well-founded learning process for service providers is needed.  The regulator must surely 
act professionally, only setting regulations that have a good chance of being achieved through 
reasonable efforts.  To quote a former CAA colleague: “Its high-level principles are good but 
the detail [of ESARR4] is seriously flawed.  It certainly seems odd that a piece of regulation 
can be produced for which there is no agreed method of compliance – and possibly no 
practical means.”   
 
In general the claims ESARR4 etc make for the methodologies proposed are overstated – not 
supported by sound evidence from real-world hazard analysis.  This obviously generates 
subsequent problems with the intended practical application of ESARR4.  Continued use of 
this document could therefore misallocate scarce safety resources, divert attention from real 
safe system improvements, waste regulators’ and managers’ time and delay safe system 
innovation.  The most important underlying change would be a refocusing on practical safety 
assessment based on methods that have already demonstrated their merits, including 
references to realistic specimen risk calculations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
All systematically applied safety defences should be considered as full parts of the integrated 
ATM safety system.  Hazard analysis calculations incorporating STCA and ACAS provide a 
measure of the true risk potential in the real world.  Excluding them has no rational basis and 
puts a huge extra burden on risk estimation: the calculations will tend to be very over-cautious 
– and hence much more pessimistic – about the value of new concepts.  This is backward 
looking: it retards the introduction of acceptably safe systems embodying novel operational 
concepts, because it is more difficult to prove their safety.  To ignore STCA and ACAS in 
risk assessment is to produce innovatory stasis, i.e. prevent safe system improvements. 
 
All ATM safety system design/operations participants have a duty of care in that they apply 
reasonable, skilful and proper use of relevant evidence, with intelligence, foresight and 
scrutiny.  Regulators have some measure of responsibility for safe ATM system 
design/operations.  It is not enough to promulgate abstract regulations in the office.  
Regulatory guidance material needs big, real-life examples.  Examples for risk assessment 
policy and guidance must cover the whole range of potential problems, including professional 
analyses of relevant incident data, and practical-orientated safety assessment based on 
methods that have already demonstrated their merits.  Poor guidance material, without clarity 
about compliance, produces indecision – and hence stasis. 
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Safety analysts and aviation decision makers usually have to make decisions based on 
evidence that is – inherently – incomplete.  Ideal hazard assessments will not be practically 
achievable in every case, so decision making requires the cooperative hard work – indeed 
wisdom – that multi-disciplinary ICAO panels can demonstrate.  Openness about data 
analysis, assumptions and reasoning, coupled with peer review and rational responses to 
critical challenge, are vital components in these processes. 
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Question Answer 
Couldn’t the ATC 
safety regulator just 
mandate STCA?   
No.  What safety basis would the regulators have for mandating?  
The regulator would need to possess the skills to write/enforce 
the rules for (e.g.) appropriate optimisation of parameters 
covering all the individual STCA applications.   
Didn’t the original 
derivations of TLSs 
exclude safety nets 
from risk assessment 
No. TLSs were derived as system design targets against all the 
risks affecting aircraft and passengers.  Thus risk calculations 
would potentially include all mitigating factors, from controller 
monitoring and intervention to STCA.   
Is it really necessary 
to include STCA in 
hazard analyses?   
Yes, because this measures the true risk potential in the real 
world.  Excluding STCA retards the introduction of acceptably 
safe systems embodying novel operational concepts.  This would 
be because it would become more difficult to prove their safety.  
Safety policies should generate safe system improvements. 
Is STCA really part of 
the ATC system?   
Yes. STCA is enabled through software in the main ATC 
computer.  It is carefully designed into the controller’s display.  
Safety regulators expect detailed guidance on STCA in the ATC 
provider’s and regulator’s formal safety documents.  UK Airprox 
reports show that controllers in practice view STCA as simply one 
of their tools.   
STCA can fail, so it 
should not be relied 
upon. 
No.  ATC system parameters and procedures are generally 
based on properly functioning system components.  If (e.g.) 
STCA or radar or communications fails, then heightened risks 
must be mitigated by (e.g.) extra staff, flightpath restrictions, flow 
regulation.  Compare Überlingen accident – Nunes and Laursen. 
Surely the present 
policy will not cause 
any harm?   
No.  If STCA were seen as a safety add-on, then what is the 
incentive for its Europe-wide introduction?  What incentives would 
they have for optimising parameters to reduce unnecessary 
warnings?  STCA must be optimised for controllers’ usage.  
Safety policies should generate safe system improvements. 
Surely STCA should 
be viewed as a safety 
‘add-on’?   
No.  The UK CAA and NATS judged STCA as necessary to 
achieve acceptable ATC safety, not an optional feature.   
Surely the ATC 
system is acceptably 
safe without STCA?   
No.  Where is there comprehensive quantitative evidence to 
support such a view for dense, complex ATC operations?   
The safety benefits 
from STCA are only 
‘marginal’ 
No.  Analyses of Airproxes demonstrate the practical importance 
of STCA in preventing very serious incidents, and show that it is 
integrated into ATC to ensure safety.   
Figure 1. Questions and answers on a rational STCA policy 
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Question Answer 
Aren’t the safety 
benefits from ACAS 
‘marginal’?   
No, see the evidence above.  If ACAS did not exist, then the 
continued achievement of current safety levels would probably 
require extra staff (for monitoring), flightpath restrictions (eg to 
reduce climb/decent frequencies), additional flow regulation (to 
reduce further controller workload peaks), and restrictions on 
non-commercial traffic (to prevent airspace incursion problems).   
Didn’t the original 
derivations of ATC 
safety targets (TLSs) 
exclude safety nets 
from risk assessment?   
No, see Figure 1  
Is it really necessary 
to include ACAS in 
hazard analyses?   
Yes, see Figure 1. 
People measure 
ATC’s performance 
excluding ACAS. 
No.  The public’s concern is with the safety level achieved in the 
real world, not with what it might have been in some theoretical 
universe – composed of ‘what ifs’ – in which ACAS did not exist.   
Separation minima 
guarantee safety. 
No.  The use of separation minima alone provides no guarantee 
that the risk of collision will be acceptably safe.  The use of 
separation minima, STCA and ACAS alerts are safety barriers 
combining to provide statistical assurance of safety rather than 
absolute guarantees.   
Surely ACAS 
performs erratically 
and has side effects?   
No.  ACAS produces fewer side effects for ATC, in terms of 
serious incidents, than cautiously estimated when first introduced.  
ACAS certainly generates some nuisance and false alerts, but 
they do not frequently lead to hazardous incidents – the real 
measure of what matters in safety terms.  ACAS improves safety, 
except if there are wider ATC operational and/or regulatory 
failures (compare Überlingen mid-air collision).  Safety policies 
should learn lessons from past accidents and incidents. 
Figure 2. Questions and answers on a rational ACAS policy 
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Figure 3. An ideal Requirement structure 
 
 
 
Figure 4. How ESARR4 fails 
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Airprox 
number Summary 
H 
Nm 
V 
feet 
1999127 Controller had issued a descent clearance that would have led 
aircraft 1 to descend through the level of aircraft 2, which he had 
inadvertently not taken into account. 
0 1100 
1999200 Controller did not take aircraft 1 into account when he descended 
aircraft 2. 
4.5 400 
2000018 Aircraft were being vectored from N and S to line up on the 
Heathrow ILS.  Controller did not ensure standard separation. 
1.2 300 
2000032 Controller gave ‘erroneously and essentially unforced descent 
instruction’ to aircraft 2. 
2.0 700 
2000055 Apparently anomalous RA [NB: TCAS II Version 7.0 not in use, so 
incident not now relevant].  Might have been malfunction or 
misheard aural warning – ‘reduce climb’ for ‘climb’?   
2.5 500 
2000126 Controller did not ensure standard separation between the two 
aircraft.  STCA did not alert because of geometry of the situation. 
1.1 700 
2001069 Controller allowed aircraft 1 to climb to the level that he had 
cleared aircraft 2 to fly at, without coordination. 
2.8 700 
Table 1. UK ‘Outside STCA parameters’ Airproxes 
Airprox 
number Summary 
H 
Nm 
V 
feet
1999221 Mentor did not detect that instruction by trainee put both aircraft at 
same level without standard separation.  Mentor issued avoiding 
action at time when pilots were responding to RAs. 
1.0 700 
2002112 The control team did not ensure that aircraft 1 was coordinated with 
the neighbouring Control Centre.  STCA was dismissed as a 
‘nuisance warning’ – aircraft 2 assumed to be climbing to level 
1000ft below aircraft 1. 
1.6 400 
2003075 Controller dispensed with vertical separation without ensuring lateral 
separation.  Controller had seen the STCA alert but did not consider 
it a problem, as he believed that aircraft 1 would safely descend 
through the level of aircraft 2. 
1.4 700 
2003164 Aircraft 1 crew descended below their cleared level into conflict with 
aircraft 2.  STCA alerted after aircraft 1 had received a TCAS RA.   
3.7 500 
2003169 A sighting report, given that aircraft 1 was in TMA airspace and the 
other in Class G airspace – deemed separated (according to the 
CAA regulations) when STCA activated.   
0.6 500 
2003184 The aircraft 2 crew read back the wrong heading and level 
instructions, which went undetected by the controller.  The controller 
said he had no reason to doubt that the aircraft would not comply 
with the issued clearance.  STCA activated and shortly afterwards a 
TCAS RA climb was issued.   
3.4 600 
Table 2. ‘STCA Warned but not actioned by controller’ Airproxes 
(a) Selection extracted from UK Airprox Reports, 1999-2003.  The first four digits of the 
number is the year, the last three is the identification.  H is the radar recorded horizontal 
distance at closest approach; V is the corresponding vertical distance. 
(b) In Table1, the STCA safety defensive layer could not provide protection; in Table 2, 
STCA alerted but was not acted upon. 
